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cule, and condemnation when they render a verdict out of keeping with
the views of other citizens.
Conclusions
When the new Hiss trial opens, a new judge and a new jury will try
to decide whether Hiss is innocent or guilty of willfully testifying falsely
about his activities with Chambers. Although it is certain that there
will be some changes in the next trial, the essential stories of the two
principal witnesses will undoubtedly remain the same. In evaluating
these two conflicting stories, little-publicized legal rules will again be
employed in an attempt to reach a unanimous jury decision. The intense dramatic flavor of the Hiss-Chambers controversy effectively highlighted three as yet unanswered legal problems: first, the application of
the so-called "two witness" rule in perjury cases; second, the relevance
of the Statute of Limitations on espionage in the perjury trial; and
third, the grave effects of the present lack of protection from disclosure
of jury deliberations and votes.
Although it will receive no headlines, the requirements of the "two
witness" rule may well be the deciding factor in the next trial. Although
it will merit little public notice, the policy of the Statute of Limitations
will be either quietly aborted, or the defense may successfully argue
that evidence of espionage is inadmissible in the perjury prosecution,
thus neatly hamstringing the government's case. Most important of all,
perhaps, will be the effect of the disclosure and subsequent public reception to the deliberations and votes of the jury in the first trial. Although the jurors in the first Hiss case may not realize it, their divulgence of their balloting may seriously undermine the functioning of the
jury system in the second trial of Alger Hiss. 60
NE~wToN MIn~ow
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Duty of State Courts to Assign Counsel-In Gibbs v. Burke, 69 S. Ct.
1247 (1949), the United States Supreme Court held that where the trial
record showed that unfairness to the defendant was apparent during
the trial, it became the duty of the trial judge to assign counsel. In
this case the court examined the record and discovered several instances
in which the lack of counsel had proven disadvantageous to the defendant; then, on the principle of Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S.455 (1941), the
Court held that the fair conduct of the trial depends primarily on the
trial judge who must determine the accused's need of counsel during
arraignment and trial. This case represents a deviation from the recent
right of counsel eases, turning on Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45
(1932). Under those cases the question of deprivation of rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment was raised in terms of either complexity of
the issues or personal inability of the defendant, either of which could
60 On October 10, 1949 Mr. Claude B. Cross, representing Mr. Hiss, moved for a
change of venue to Rutland, Vt. Federal Judge Alfred C. Coxe denied the motion,
which was based on allegations that excess publicity in New York had eliminated
all chances of a fair second trial in New York. For a discussion of judicial attempts
to suppress prejudicial radio and newspaper comment on pending criminal trials
see Comment (1949) 40 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 50. As this article goes to press,
the second Hiss trial is scheduled to begin November 17, 1949 in New York.
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be gauged before the actual trial. By resorting to the rule in Betts v.
Brady and indulging in a retrospective examination of the record of the
trial, the Court has broadened the duty of the trial judge to see that the
accused is represented by counsel, still without making the Sixth Amendment requirement mandatory in all cases. (For a complete discussion of
the recent Supreme Court cases on this point see Right of Counsel Today
(1948), 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 432.)
Counsel's Closing Argument to Jury Limited-A growing group of cases
recently have tended to supervise more closely the conduct of counsel's
closing argument to the jury in criminal cases. In line with this trend,
the remarks of the prosecuting attorney in Woods v. Commonwealth,
220 S. W. (2d) 1012 (Ky. 1949) were held prejudicial to the defendant.
The only eye-witness-to the killing with which the defendant was charged
was his brother, Johnny Woods, who testified in a manner which tended
to prove self-defense. At a former trial of the cause evidence proving
that Johnny Woods had given false testimony concerning a previous
arrest in Louisville and the renting of an automobile there was held
inadmissible. While not redeveloping this evidence, the Commonwealth
Attorney, in his closing argument to the jury, discussed these facts and
pointed out that Johnny Woods had a tendency to prevaricate. On
appeal, the Kentucky court held that this was prejudicial since it brought
facts in from outside the record which would tend to destroy the credibility of an essential witness.
Likewise, in disciplinary proceedings growing out of the conduct
of counsel in a trial for violation of the Pennsylvania Magistrates Court
Act, the remarks of counsel for the defendant regarding the power of
the jury, in closing argument, were held to be improper. Defense counsel told the jury that they were the judges of the law as well as the facts
and therefore had a right to disregard the trial court's instructions.
Although it is held that counsel may state what he believes to be the law
and to base his arguments on such theories, it is improper for counsel to
attempt to persuade the jury that they are not bound by the instructions as to the law of the case which they receive from the trial court. In
re Schofield, 66 A. (2d) 675 (Pa. 1949) (For a general discussion of the
scope of argument see Goldstein, Trial Technique (1935), §§694-718.)
Evidence of Subsequent Robbery Admissible to Prove Design in Felony
Murder-After robbing one tavern, defendant and his confederates fled
in an automobile, one of the confederates shooting the deceased, a bystander, from the automobile during the course of fight. Later the same
evening, the group robbed another tavern. (Commonwealth v. Darcy,
66 A. (2d) 663 (Pa. 1949). Evidence of the second robbery was admitted
to establish the fact that the murder occurred during the execution of
a preconceived series of felonies. This view seems reasonable since without it, the proof of common design necessary to a felony murder conviction would be difficult, if not impossible, in this rather common fact
situation. Thus the courts, generally, will permit the showing of a
subsequent or antecedent crime as an exception to the general rule
against the admissibility of other crimes where the offense requires a
showing of common design. For a general discussion of this exception,
see 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940), §§300-304.

